Conceivability and Modal Knowledge by Casullo, Albert
 Christopher  Hill ( 2006 ) provides an account of modal knowledge that is set 
in a broader context of arguing against the view that conceivability provides 
epistemic access to the metaphysical modalities. His goal is “to identify the 
sources and forms of our knowledge of metaphysical possibility and meta-
physical necessity” (205). 1 The account proceeds in two stages. First, he con-
tends that “metaphysical necessity and metaphysical possibility can be 
reductively explained in terms of the subjunctive conditional” (224). Second, 
he maintains that his reductive explanation of metaphysical necessity yields 
two tests for determining whether a proposition is metaphysically necessary 
and two corresponding tests for determining whether a proposition is meta-
physically possible. 2 Finally, Hill argues that his reductive account of the 
metaphysical modalities in conjunction with his account of modal knowledge 
underwrites the further conclusion that conceivability does not provide a 
reliable test for metaphysical possibility. 
 13 
Conceivability and Modal Knowledge 
 1. All page references in the text are to  Hill ( 2006 ) unless otherwise indicated. 
 2. For an alternative att empt to reduce the metaphysical modalities to the subjunctive conditional 
and to provide an account of modal knowledge in terms of knowledge of subjunctive conditionals, 
see  Williamson ( 2007 ). Williamson’s account is critically evaluated in  chapter  12 here. 
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 My focus is on Hill’s two tests for determining the metaphysical modal-
ities and how they bear on the view that conceivability provides epistemic 
access to metaphysical possibility. I argue that Hill’s first test does not iden-
tify the source of our modal knowledge and, moreover, that an examination 
of the assumptions that motivate the test reveals that such knowledge does 
not require the employment of our cognitive mechanisms or procedures for 
evaluating subjunctive conditionals. I also argue that although the second 
test appears to provide an account of modal knowledge that does require the 
employment of our cognitive mechanisms or procedures for evaluating sub-
junctive conditionals, the appearances are misleading. A closer examination 
reveals that the second test collapses into the first, which does not require 
the employment of those cognitive mechanisms or procedures. Hence, Hill’s 
reductive explanation of the metaphysical modalities in terms of the sub-
junctive conditional does not yield a reductive explanation of knowledge of 
metaphysical modality in terms of knowledge of subjunctive conditionals. 
Finally, I argue that his account of modal knowledge is at odds with his con-
tention that conceivability does not provide epistemic access to metaphysi-
cal possibility. 
 1  
 Hill off ers two arguments in support of the claim that metaphysical necessity is 
reducible to the subjunctive conditional. Th e fi rst, which I call the  A-argument , 
begins with  Lewis’s ( 1973 ) defi nition of a necessity operator in terms of the sub-
junctive conditional:
  df
(A1) A  A A.= >∼
 
 Hill’s goal is to show that Lewis’s operator expresses genuine metaphysical 
necessity. On Lewis’s account, propositions containing ☐ have the following 
truth conditions:
 (A2)  ☐A is true at a possible world W just in case A is true at every  possible 
world that is accessible from W. 
 According to the standard picture,
 (A3)  If a proposition is metaphysically necessary, then it holds in all 
 possible worlds. 
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 Hill (221), however, maintains: 
 (A4)  Th e possible worlds that are accessible from W include all possible 
worlds. 3 
 Th erefore, it follows that
 (A5)  ☐A is true at W just in case A is true at all possible worlds. 
 Since Lewis’s operator captures the central feature of the standard picture, Hill 
concludes: 
 (A6) Lewis’s operator expresses genuine metaphysical necessity. 
 Hill (223) notes that Lewis’s defi nition of necessity can be restated as (A1*) by 
using substitutional quantifi cation
 (A1*)  dfA ( Q )(Q A)= Π >  , 
 where (ΠQ) is the universal substitutional quantifi er. His subsequent discussion 
employs (A1*). 
 Hill’s second argument, which I call the  B-argument , has two premises:
 (B1)  When we refl ectively consider the familiar examples of metaphysi-
cal necessity, we fi nd that they are always propositions that we are 
prepared to presuppose as valid in our subjunctive reasoning. 
 3. Hill off ers the following supporting argument for (A4): 
 (S1)  Suppose that R is a respect of comparison such that worlds not similar to the actual world in 
respect R are not accessible from the actual world. 
 (S2)  Th is suggestion is refuted by the fact that there are nonvacuous counterfactuals that begin 
as follows: If the world were diff erent in respect R, . . . 
 (S3)  We regard such counterfactuals as having truth values. 
 (S4)  We do not see them as vacuously true as is shown by the fact that we are prepared to give 
substantive reasons for accepting or rejecting them. 
 (S5)  Th erefore, we are prepared to entertain subjunctive conditionals that are arbitrarily diff er-
ent than the actual world. (221–222) 
 Hill goes on to extend the argument to show that where W is any possible world, all possible worlds 
are accessible from W. 
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 (B2)  When we consider the propositions that we presuppose as valid 
across subjunctive reasoning, we fi nd that we are always prepared to 
regard them as metaphysically necessary. 
 (B3)  Th erefore, metaphysical necessity can be reductively explained in 
terms of the subjunctive conditional. (224) 
 Th e B-argument depends on the idea of presupposing a proposition as valid in 
subjunctive reasoning. Hill goes on to articulate three underlying assumptions 
that motivate his use of this idea. 
 Consider some proposition P that we treat as valid in subjunctive reasoning, 
such as that George W. Bush is a human being. Hill’s underlying assumptions can 
be stated as follows:
 (UA1)  Our subjunctive reasoning refl ects commitments to a range of prop-
ositions that have the following form: If P, then (ΠQ) (Q > P). 
 (UA2)  Th ese particular commitments derive from commitments to 
certain more general propositions such as: 
 (21)  (∀x) (∀K) (if x is a biological substance and K is a biological kind 
to which x belongs, then (ΠQ) (Q > x is a biological substance 
that belongs to K). 
 (UA3)  Propositions like (21) are a priori propositions that are partially 
constitutive of certain of the concepts that occur in them—and in 
particular, of the subjunctive conditional. (226–227) 
 Hill (227–228) notes that the views articulated in (UA1)–(UA3) are closely 
related to Kripke’s account of a posteriori necessities. 
 Kripke ( 1971 , 153; quoted by Hill, 227) off ers the following account of our 
knowledge of a posteriori necessities:
 In other words, if  P is the statement that the lectern is not made of ice, one 
knows by a priori philosophical analysis, some conditional of the form “if  P , 
then necessarily  P .” If the table is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made 
of ice. On the other hand, then, we know by empirical investigation that  P , 
the antecedent of the conditional, is true—that this table is not made of ice. 
We can conclude by  modus ponens : 
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 According to Kripke, our knowledge that necessarily P, where P is some necessary 
a posteriori proposition, is based on an inference from two other propositions: 
(1) P; and (2) If P, then necessarily P. We know (1) a posteriori and (2) a priori. 
 Hill (228) highlights the following parallel between his account and Kripke’s. 
Where P is any necessary a posteriori proposition, such as that George W. Bush 
is a human being, Kripke holds that the following proposition can be known a 
priori:
 (24) If P, then it is metaphysically necessary that P. 
 Hill, on the other hand, holds the following proposition can be known a priori:
 (25) If P, then (ΠQ) (Q > P). 
 Given (A1*), (24) and (25) are analytically equivalent. Hill (228), however, 
adds the further claim, not found in Kripke’s account, that propositions of the 
form (25) are defi nitional in character, following from more general principles, 
such as (21), that are partially constitutive of the subjunctive conditional. Th e 
fact that (25) follows from more general principles that are partially constitutive 
of the subjunctive conditional explains the a priori status of (25). 4 
 2  
 Hill contends that his reductive explanation of the metaphysical modalities yields 
two tests for determining whether a proposition is metaphysically necessary. Th e 
fi rst, which I call the  B-test , derives from the B-argument, whose central claim is 
that the class of propositions that we presuppose as valid in subjunctive reasoning 
is the same as the class of propositions that we regard as metaphysically necessary. 
Utilizing that claim, he argues that we can determine whether the proposition that 
P is metaphysically necessary by examining its role in subjunctive reasoning:
 4. Hill off ers the following remarks regarding constitutive propositions:
 Suppose that the proposition that  P is partially constitutive of the concept  C . It appears that 
all of the following are true. (i) We regard  P as available for use in justifi cations of other prop-
ositions that contain  C , and for use in explanations of the truth of other propositions, but we 
do not regard it as desirable or even possible to provide a justifi cation for  P , or an explanation 
of the truth of  P . . . . (vi) We are committ ed to treating  P as operative in characterizing the 
belief systems of other agents, provided only that those agents are assumed to possess  C . . . . 
What I mean by this is that if we believe that another agent  A possesses the concept  C , then 
we will think it prima facie appropriate to assume that  A believes that  P . (207–208 n. 1) 
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 Suppose that when we analyze that role, we fi nd that we are prepared to use 
P in elaborating subjunctive suppositions whenever it is relevant to them, 
and that we never rely on propositions that are incompatible with P in elab-
orating subjunctive suppositions. In eff ect, we will have found that we pre-
suppose that P is valid in subjunctive reasoning. Assuming that the foregoing 
claim about metaphysical necessity is correct, this result makes it reason-
able to conclude that P is metaphysically necessary. (230) 
 According to the B-test, fi nding that we presuppose some proposition as valid in 
subjunctive reasoning provides a good reason to conclude that it is metaphysi-
cally necessary. 
 Th e B-test is of limited epistemic import. Although it may provide a procedure 
for identifying those propositions that we regard as metaphysically necessary, it 
tells us nothing about how we know those propositions that we regard as meta-
physically necessary. In particular, the B-test does not show that we know those 
propositions by engaging our cognitive mechanisms or procedures for evaluating 
subjunctive conditionals. 
 Th e B-test exploits the following biconditional:
 (BTl)  We regard P as metaphysically necessary just in case we presup-
pose P as valid in subjunctive reasoning. 
 Suppose that we examine our subjunctive reasoning and discover:
 (BT2)  We presuppose P as valid in subjunctive reasoning. 
 According to Hill, we now have reason to conclude: 
 (BT3) P is metaphysically necessary. 
 Although (BT2) identifi es P as a proposition that we presuppose as valid in sub-
junctive reasoning, it is silent about how we know the propositions that we pre-
suppose as valid in subjunctive reasoning. More specifi cally, (BT2) does not 
entail or support the further conclusion that our knowledge of the propositions 
that we presuppose as valid in our subjunctive reasoning derives from our 
cognitive mechanisms or procedures for evaluating subjunctive conditionals. 
Th erefore, the B-argument tells us nothing about the sources of our knowledge of 
metaphysical necessities. 
 Moreover, an examination of the assumptions that underlie the B-test reveals 
that they provide an account of our knowledge of metaphysical necessity in which 
our cognitive mechanisms or procedures for evaluating subjunctive conditionals 
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play no role. Hill maintains that if P is a necessary proposition, then we can know 
a priori a proposition of the form:
 (25) If P, then (ΠQ) (Q > P). 
 If we consider a necessary a posteriori proposition, such as
 (P1) George W. Bush is a human being, 
 then the following proposition can be known a priori:
 (P2)  If George W. Bush is a human being, then (ΠQ) (Q > George W. 
Bush is a human being). 
 Moreover, according to Hill, (P2) follows from a more general a priori 
principle,
 (21)  (∀x) (∀K) (if x is a biological substance and K is the biological kind 
to which x belongs, then (ΠQ) (Q > x is a biological substance that 
belongs to K), 
 that is partially constitutive of the subjunctive conditional. Given (A1*), one can 
infer:
 (P3) Necessarily, George W. Bush is a human being 
 from (P1) and (P2). 
 The account of knowledge of necessary a posteriori propositions that 
emerges from the B-test, which I call the  B-account , parallels Kripke’s 
account. Knowledge of necessary a posteriori propositions, such as (P3), is 
inferential. It is based on knowledge of two premises: (P1) and (P2). 
Knowledge of (P1) is a posteriori, based on observations of Bush’s physical 
features and behavior. (P2) is a consequence of (21), which is a proposition 
that is constitutive of the subjunctive conditional and that we can know a 
priori. Therefore, at the fundamental level, knowledge of a posteriori neces-
sities does not involve either engaging our cognitive mechanisms or proce-
dures for evaluating subjunctive conditionals or determining which 
propositions we presuppose as valid in our subjunctive reasoning. The only 
role played by subjunctive conditionals is that knowledge of (P2) derives 
from a priori principles that are constitutive of the concept of the subjunc-
tive conditional. 
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 3  
 Th e second test, which I call the  A-test , derives from the A-argument. According to 
it, we can determine whether the proposition that P is metaphysically necessary 
by evaluating a representative range of propositions that have the following form:
 (30) Q > P 
 Hill (230) maintains: “Th ere is no doubt that we can do this, for there is no doubt 
that we possess one or more cognitive mechanisms designed specifi cally to eval-
uate subjunctives.” If we deploy these mechanisms and fi nd that the representa-
tive propositions of the form (30) are all true, we will have good reason to 
believe
 (30*) (ΠQ) (Q > P) 
 and, a fortiori, that P is metaphysically necessary. For example, Hill (231) main-
tains that if we wish to determine whether the proposition that 2 x 3 = 6 is meta-
physically necessary, we can proceed by considering questions such as the 
following:
 (Q1)  Would it still be true that 2 x 3 = 6 if the only existing objects were 
abstract entities? 
 (Q2)  Would it still be true that 2 x 3 = 6 if everything was in constant fl ux, 
with objects dissolving into new objects as soon as they were counted? 
 If the answers are all affi  rmative, then we have good reason to believe that 2 x 3 = 6 
is metaphysically necessary. 
 Hill goes on to argue that our modal beliefs amount to knowledge. Here he 
appeals to the fact that subjunctive conditionals can be confi rmed and discon-
fi rmed by empirical evidence:
 Now it seems to be the case that the subjunctive conditionals that we accept 
tend to be confi rmed by the evidence that is relevant to them. If this impres-
sion is correct, then it is reasonable to regard our procedures for evaluating 
subjunctive conditionals as reliable, and by the same token, it is reasonable 
to regard our subjunctive beliefs as knowledge. (231–232) 
 Since we have empirical evidence that our procedures for evaluating subjunctive 
conditionals are reliable, we have reason to believe that beliefs based on those 
procedures constitute knowledge. 
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 Th e A-test appears to provide an account of modal knowledge that diff ers in a 
signifi cant way from the B-account. Th e B-account of modal knowledge parallels 
Kripke’s account. Our knowledge that necessarily P, where P is some necessary a 
posteriori proposition, is based on an inference from two other propositions: (1) 
P, and (2) If P, then (ΠQ) (Q > P). We know (1) a posteriori and (2) a priori, but 
neither our knowledge of (1) nor our knowledge of (2) requires engaging our 
cognitive mechanisms or procedures for evaluating subjunctive conditionals. 
Th e A-test, however, appears to provide an account of our modal knowledge that 
requires engaging our cognitive mechanisms or procedures for evaluating sub-
junctive conditionals. According to the A-test, we know propositions such as
 (30*) (ΠQ) (Q > P) 
 by inductive generalization from a representative range of propositions that have 
the form
 (30) Q > P. 
 But, in order to know such propositions, we must employ our cognitive mecha-
nisms or procedures for evaluating subjunctive conditionals. Th erefore, the A-test 
appears to require the employment of our mechanisms or procedures for evalu-
ating subjunctive conditionals. 
 Closer examination, however, reveals that the A-test does not require the 
employment of our cognitive mechanisms or procedures for evaluating subjunctive 
conditionals. Given the B-account of modal knowledge, the employment of our 
cognitive mechanisms or procedures for evaluating subjunctive conditionals is otiose; 
for anyone who is in the position to evaluate subjunctive conditionals of the form
 (30) Q > P 
 is also in a position to know a priori that they are true. 
 Consider Hill’s application of the A-test to the necessary proposition that 
2 x 3 = 6. According to that test, we examine instances of (30), such as
 (I1)  If the only existing objects were abstract entities, 2 x 3 = 6 would be true; 
 (I2)  If everything was in constant fl ux, with objects dissolving into new 
objects as soon as they were counted, 2 x 3 = 6 would be true. 
 In order to evaluate (I1) and (I2), however, we must know whether the proposi-
tion that 2 x 3 = 6 is true. If, for example, we consider the following subjunctive 
conditionals
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 (I3)  If the only existing objects were abstract entities, the Goldbach 
Conjecture would be true; 
 (I4)  If everything was in constant fl ux, with objects dissolving into new objects 
as soon as they were counted, the Goldbach Conjecture would be true; 
 we are not in a position to evaluate them since we don’t know whether the 
Goldbach Conjecture is true. 
 Once we recognize that the A-test is applicable only if we know the truth value 
of the proposition in question, we can also see that we need not engage our 
cognitive mechanisms or procedures for evaluating subjunctive conditionals in 
order to apply it. Consider a necessary proposition, such as
 (P1) George W. Bush is a human being, 
 and assume that we know that it is true. According to Hill, if P is a necessary prop-
osition, then we can know a priori a proposition of the form
 (25) If P, then (ΠQ) (Q > P). 
 Hence, we can know a priori
 (P2)  If George W. Bush is a human being then (ΠQ) (Q 〉 George W. 
Bush is a human being). 
 (P2) is a consequence of the more general a priori principle
 (21)  (∀x) (∀K) (if x is a biological substance and K is the biological kind to which 
x belongs, then (ΠQ) (Q > x is a biological substance that belongs to K), 
 which is constitutive of the subjunctive conditional and can be known a priori. 
Hence, anyone who possesses the concept of the subjunctive conditional and 
knows that (P1) is true can know via inference from (P1) and (P2) that
 (P4) (ΠQ) (Q > George W. Bush is a human being). 
 Th ere is no need to evaluate a range of propositions of the form
 (P5) Q > George W. Bush is a human being 
 and to inductively infer (P4) on that basis. Moreover, anyone who possesses the 
concept of the subjunctive conditional and knows that (P1) is true can know 
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propositions of the form (P5) by inference from (P4). Th erefore, where P is a 
necessary proposition, one who knows that P is true can know both general prop-
ositions of the form
 (30*) (ΠQ) (Q > P) 
 as well as their instances, without employing the cognitive mechanisms or proce-
dures that we use to assess subjunctive conditionals. 5 Th eir employment is otiose. 
 One might object that my assessment of the signifi cance of the A-test is unduly 
pessimistic. Even if the B-account of modal knowledge indicates that it is unnec-
essary to employ our cognitive mechanisms or procedures for evaluating sub-
junctive conditionals in order to know propositions of the form
 (30) Q > P, 
 it does not follow that those mechanisms or procedures cannot be employed to 
arrive at such knowledge. We may have here a case of epistemic overdetermina-
tion; that is, two diff erent, but independent, routes to knowledge of the meta-
physical modalities. 
 Although epistemic overdetermination remains a possibility on Hill’s account 
of knowledge of metaphysical necessities, there are two reasons for doubting that 
 5. I have argued that the only role played by subjunctive conditionals in Hill’s account of modal 
knowledge is that general principles, such as (21), are alleged to be constitutive of the concept of 
the subjunctive conditional. But even this role seems dispensable given the close relationship bet-
ween Hill’s fi rst test and Kripke’s account. Where P is any necessary a posteriori proposition, Kripke 
holds that the following proposition is knowable a priori: 
 (24) If P , then it is metaphysically necessary that P , 
 whereas Hill holds the following proposition is knowable a priori: 
 (25) If P , then (ΠQ) (Q > P). 
 For Hill, propositions of form (25) are knowable a priori because they follow from more general 
principles, such as (21), that are alleged to be constitutive of the concept of the subjunctive 
conditional. One who favors Kripke’s account has available a similar strategy. He or she could main-
tain that propositions of the form (24) are knowable a priori because they follow from more gen-
eral principles, such as 
 (21*)  (∀x) (∀K) (if x is a biological substance and K is the biological kind to which x 
belongs, then ☐ (x is a biological substance that belongs to K), 
 that are constitutive of the concept of metaphysical necessity. Hill’s appeal to subjunctive condi-
tionals adds a layer of theory that off ers no increase in explanatory power over the view inspired by 
Kripke’s account. 
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there is an independent route to such knowledge via our procedures for evalu-
ating subjunctive conditionals. First, there is a signifi cant question that can be 
raised with respect to Hill’s argument in support of the claim that beliefs about 
metaphysical necessity generated by the evaluation of subjunctive conditionals 
amount to knowledge. Second, there is a signifi cant gap in Hill’s account of how 
we acquire knowledge of metaphysical necessities via the exercise of our proce-
dures for evaluating subjunctive conditionals. 
 Hill’s argument (231–232) in support of the claim that our beliefs about meta-
physical necessity amount to knowledge can be stated as follows:
 (K1)  Claims of metaphysical necessity are equivalent to generalized sub-
junctive conditionals. 
 (K2)  Subjunctive conditionals can be confi rmed and disconfi rmed by 
empirical evidence. 
 (K3)  Th e subjunctive conditionals that we accept tend to be confi rmed 
by the empirical evidence that is relevant to them. 
 (K4)  Th erefore, it is reasonable to regard our procedures for evaluating 
subjunctive conditionals as reliable and our subjunctive beliefs 
as knowledge. 
 Th e key premise in the argument is (K3). For example, the subjunctive 
conditional
 (I*) If I hadn’t given her the medicine, she wouldn’t have recovered 
 gives rise to the indicative prediction
 (IP*)  If medication is withheld in similar cases, the patients will not 
recover. 
 So cases of patients who do not recover because medication is withheld confi rm 
(IP*). 
 Th e subjunctive conditionals that are involved in the evaluation of metaphysi-
cally necessary propositions, however, do not appear to be confi rmed by empirical 
evidence. Consider, for example, the subjunctive conditionals that, according to 
Hill, are relevant to the confi rmation of the necessary proposition that 2 x 3 = 6:
 (I1)  If the only existing objects were abstract entities, 2 x 3 = 6 would be 
true; and 
 (I2)  If everything was in constant fl ux, with objects dissolving into new 
objects as soon as they were counted, 2 x 3 = 6 would be true; 
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 which give rise to the indicative predictions:
 (IP1) If all concrete objects are destroyed, then 2 x 3 = 6 is true; and 
 (IP2)  If everything is placed in constant fl ux, with objects dissolving into 
new objects as soon as they were counted, 2 x 3 = 6 is true. 
 It is unclear what empirical evidence, if any, supports (IP1) and (IP2). If we 
consider
 (P1) George W. Bush is a human being, 
 the situation is worse. We lack an account of (a) the subjunctive conditionals rel-
evant to confi rming (P1), (b) the relevant indicative predictions that derive from 
those subjunctive conditionals, and (c) the empirical evidence that confi rms 
those predictions. Hence, at best, (K3) remains questionable for the case of meta-
physically necessary propositions. 
 Even if (K3) can be substantiated in the case of metaphysically necessary 
propositions, a significant gap remains in Hill’s account of our knowledge of 
metaphysical necessities. On his view, a metaphysically necessary proposi-
tion that P is analytically equivalent to a universally quantified proposition 
of the form
 (30*) (ΠQ) (Q > P). 
 His argument, if sound, establishes that we have knowledge of the premises 
that constitute the basis of our alleged (inductive) inferential knowledge 
that (30*) via the exercise of our procedures for evaluating subjunctive 
conditionals. But Hill has not provided any indication of how we move 
from knowledge of such premises to knowledge of metaphysically necessary 
propositions. His account is silent about (a) the content of the inferential 
principle (or principles) that mediate the transition from premises of the 
form
 (30) (Q > P) 
 to conclusions of the form
 (30*) (ΠQ) (Q > P), 
 and (b) how we know those principles. Th erefore, the case for overdetermination 
is, at best, premature. 
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 4  
 I have argued that the A-test does not require the employment of our cognitive 
mechanisms or procedures for evaluating subjunctive conditionals. Given the 
B-account of modal knowledge, their employment is otiose. Moreover, as I shall 
now argue, the reason why Hill fails to recognize that their employment is otiose 
is that he fails to distinguish two diff erent targets of an account of modal 
knowledge. Th is failure also mitigates his negative assessment of the view that 
conceivability provides epistemic access to the metaphysical modalities. 
 Th ere are two diff erent potential targets for an account of modal knowledge. In 
order to locate them precisely, let us introduce the following distinctions:
 (A)  S knows the  truth value of p just in case S knows that p is true or S 
knows that p is false. 
 (B)  S knows the  general  modal  status of p just in case S knows that p is a 
necessary proposition (i.e., necessarily true or necessarily false) or S 
knows that p is a contingent proposition (i.e., contingently true or 
contingently false). 
 (C)  S knows the  specifi c  modal  status of p just in case S knows that p is 
necessarily true or S knows that p is necessarily false or S knows that 
p is contingently true or S knows that p is contingently false. 
 An account of modal knowledge can have as its target either knowledge of the 
general modal status of a proposition or knowledge of its specifi c modal status. 
 Th e goal of the A-test is to provide an account of knowledge of propositions of 
the form
 (30*) (ΠQ) (Q > P), 
 which, by (A1*), are analytically equivalent to propositions of the form ☐P. 
Hence, the target of the A-test is knowledge of the specifi c modal status of 
necessary propositions. But, as Kripke’s discussion of the lectern example high-
lights, knowledge of the specifi c modal status of a necessary proposition is the 
conjunction of knowledge of its truth value and knowledge of its general modal 
status. Moreover, on Kripke’s account, knowledge of the general modal status of 
a necessary proposition is more fundamental than knowledge of its specifi c 
modal status. Knowledge of the specifi c modal status of a necessary proposition 
is based on an inference from knowledge of its general modal status and knowledge 
of its truth value. Th e B-account of modal knowledge, which parallels Kripke’s 
account, has as its target knowledge of the general modal status of necessary 
propositions. Since it provides an account of knowledge of the general modal 
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status of necessary propositions in terms of constitutive a priori principles, it is 
unnecessary to employ our cognitive mechanisms or procedures for evaluating 
subjunctive conditionals in order to know propositions of the form (30*). Anyone 
who is in the position to evaluate subjunctive conditionals of the form
 (30) Q > P 
 is also in a position to know a priori that they are true. 
 Hill’s failure to distinguish the two diff erent targets of an account of modal 
knowledge also mitigates his pessimistic assessment of the relationship between 
conceivability and the metaphysical modalities. He contends that it is a mistake 
to think that “conceivability is somehow the foundation of our epistemic access 
to these metaphysical modalities” (205). More specifi cally, his goal is to argue 
that the following principle, which I call the  Conceivability Principle , is false: If it 
is within our power to conceive coherently of its being the case that P, then it is 
metaphysically possible that P. 
 Hill off ers the following articulation of the concept of coherent conceiving:
 if it is true that we can coherently conceive of its being the case that  P , then 
it must also be true (a) that we are able to entertain the proposition that  P , 
(b) that the proposition that  P is compatible with the laws of logic, (c) that 
the proposition that  P is compatible with the laws of mathematics, and (d) 
that the proposition that  P is compatible with all of the a priori principles 
that are constitutive of the relevant concepts, . . . Finally, . . . in addition to 
being necessary conditions of our being able to conceive coherently of its 
being the case that  P , (a)–(d) are also suffi  cient for us to have this ability. 
(207) 
 Since Hill holds that the propositions in conditions (b)–(d) are both a priori and 
cognitively robust (i.e., they play an essential role in the edifi ce of human 
knowledge), he labels them  AR-propositions . 
 Hill’s (208) account of coherent conceiving has the consequence that “we can 
coherently conceive of the truth of any entertainable proposition that is not pre-
cluded by AR-propositions.” Assuming that an a priori proposition is one that 
can be known a priori and that an a posteriori proposition is one that can be 
known only a posteriori, it follows that any entertainable a posteriori proposition 
is coherently conceivable. In particular, if we consider examples of necessary a 
posteriori propositions, such as
 (P1) George W. Bush is a human being; and 
 (P6) Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus; 
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 their negations are coherently conceivable. 6 We can coherently conceive of 
the truth of both not-(P1) and not-(P6) because we can entertain them and 
their truth is compatible with all propositions that are knowable a priori. 
 In order to assess the relationship between coherent conceiving and possi-
bility, Hill (209–210) distinguishes two forms of possibility:
 (CP)  It is  conceptually possible that P if the proposition that P is  compatible 
with all of the propositions that count as AR-propositions; and 
 (MP)  It is  metaphysically possible that P if the proposition that P is com-
patible with all AR-propositions and, in addition, with a large and 
heterogenous class of propositions that enumerate the essential 
properties of substances and kinds. 
 Hill (211) contends that coherent conceiving is suffi  cient for conceptual possibility 
but not for metaphysical possibility since “the conditions that defi ne coherent con-
ceiving are much less restrictive than the conditions that defi ne metaphysical possi-
bility.” It is possible for a proposition to satisfy the former without satisfying the 
latt er because the former requires only compatibility with all AR-propositions, but 
the latt er requires, in addition, compatibility with all propositions that state the 
essential properties of substances and kinds (call them  E-proposition s). 
 Hill’s argument against the Conceivability Principle is based on three conten-
tions. First, coherent conceiving requires compatibility only with AR-propositions, 
that is, propositions that are a priori and cognitively robust. Second, metaphysical 
possibility requires compatibility with both AR-propositions and E-propositions. 
Th ird, E-propositions are not a priori. Consider an E-proposition, such as
 (P1) George W. Bush is a human being. 
 Since (P1) is not an a priori proposition, it is not an AR-proposition. Since (P1) is not 
an AR-proposition, not-(P1) is compatible with all AR-propositions and, as a 
consequence, is coherently conceivable. Th erefore, according to the Conceivability 
Principle, it is metaphysically possible that not-(P1), which entails that it is not neces-
sarily true that (P1). Since (P1) is necessarily true, Hill’s argument establishes that 
coherent conceiving is not a reliable guide to the  specifi c modal status of E-propositions. 
 Th e view that conceivability provides epistemic access to the metaphysical 
modalities is ambiguous. It can be understood in two ways:
 6. I assume here, following Hill, that Kripke is correct about the epistemic status of these proposi-
tions. Th e issue is controversial. In particular, some maintain that (P6) is a priori. For a discussion 
of some of the complexities generated by Kripke’s examples, see  Casullo ( 2003 ,  chapter  7 ) and 
 Casullo ( 2010 ). 
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 (C1)  Conceivability provides epistemic access to the  general modal status 
of propositions; or 
 (C2)  Conceivability provides epistemic access to the  specifi c modal status 
of propositions. 
 Hill’s argument establishes that (C2) is false. But, from the fact that (C2) is false, 
it does not follow that (C1) is false. Moreover, if the B-account of modal 
knowledge is correct, it follows that coherent conceiving is as reliable a guide to 
the general modal status of E-propositions as it is to the general modal status of 
AR-propositions. 
 Consider again
 (P1)  George W. Bush is a human being. 
 According to Hill, the following proposition can be known a priori
 (P2)  If George W. Bush is a human being then (ΠQ) (Q > George W. 
Bush is a human being). 
 Moreover, (P2) follows from a more general a priori principle:
 (21)  (∀x) (∀K) (if x is a biological substance and K is the biological 
kind to which x belongs, then (ΠQ) (Q > x is a biological sub-
stance that belongs to K), 
 which is partially constitutive of the subjunctive conditional. Since (21) is an a 
priori principle that is partially constitutive of the subjunctive conditional, it is an 
AR-proposition. Th erefore, the proposition
 (P7)  It is not the case that if George W. Bush is a human being, then nec-
essarily George W. Bush is a human being 
 is not coherently conceivable. 
 More generally, Hill maintains that, where P is any E-proposition, the 
corresponding proposition of the form
 (25)  If P, then (ΠQ) (Q > P) 
 follows from more general principles that are partially constitutive of the sub-
junctive conditional and can be known a priori. Th erefore, it is a consequence of 
the B-account of modal knowledge that coherent conceiving is a reliable guide to 
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the general modal status of E-propositions. Where P is any E-proposition, the 
corresponding proposition of the form
 (P8) It is not the case that if P, then it is metaphysically necessary that P 
 is not coherently conceivable. 
 Th e B-account of modal knowledge has two consequences. First, coherent 
conceiving is a reliable guide to the general modal status of all necessary proposi-
tions. Th e access that it provides to the general modal status (or necessity) of 
E-propositions is as reliable as the access that it provides to the general modal 
status (or necessity) of AR-propositions. Second, although coherent conceiving 
is a reliable guide to the specifi c modal status of AR-propositions, it is not a reli-
able guide to the specifi c modal status of E-propositions. 7 Hence, Hill is correct 
in maintaining that coherent conceiving is not a reliable guide to the specifi c 
modal status of E-propositions. However, since he fails to distinguish between 
the general modal status and the specifi c modal status of necessary propositions, 
he overlooks the fact that the principle that coherent conceiving is a reliable guide 
to the general modal status of E-propositions is a consequence of the B-account 
of modal knowledge. 8 
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